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INDUCED BY FRIGHT-IMPACT RULE
The plaintiff, upon being charged by the defendant's trespassing bull,
collapsed from fright which resulted in an attack of coronary insufficiency.
At no time was she struck by the bull. Held, there can be no recovery
of damages for injury resulting from fright unless accompanied by physical
injury or impact. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
According to the weight of authority,1 physical injuries due to fright
or shock unaccompanied by any other clement of actual damage can be
made the basis of recovery in actions of negligence. The landmark Irish
case of Bell v. Great Northern Ry.2 initiated this line of reasoning by
allowing the plaintiff to prove, in the absence of any physical impact,
that his injury was a reasonable consequence of the defendant's negligence.
An additional view was announced in the parent American case of Hill v.
Kimball.3 The court realized that even though it is more difficult to
produce injuries through the operation of the mind than by direct physical
means, this does not afford grounds for refusing compensation.4 Fright
and shock are both regarded not as intervening agents, but as natural
and probable forces which are but a link in the chain of causation between
1. Ala.: Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205
(1916). Cal.: Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918); Conn.: Orlo
v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Ca.: Williamson v. Central
Ry., 127 Ga, 125, 56 S.E. 117 (1906); Iowa: Watson v. Dilts 116 Iowa 249, 89
N.V. 1068 (1902); Kan.: Clemin v. Atchison, 1'. & S. F. Rv., 126 Kan. 181, 268
Pac. 103 (1928); La.: Stewart v. Arkansas Southern R.R., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676
(1904); Md.: Bowman v. Williams, 164 AId. 397, 165 At]. 182 (1933); Alinn: Purcell
v. St.PauI City R.R., 48 Minn. 34, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Mont.: Chasin v. Northern
P.R.R., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934); Neb.: Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235
N.W. 335 (1931); NI.: Chicehiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H.
329, 150 Ati. 540 (1930); N.C.: Kimberly v. Ilowland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778
(1906); Ore.: Salmi v. Columbia & N.R.R., 75 Ore. 200. 146 Pac. 819 (1915); Ri.:
Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Aft. 202 (1907); S.C.: Mack v. South Bend
R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 005 (1897); S.D.: Sternhagen v. Kozel. 40 S.D. 396, 162 NAW
398 (1918); Tenn.: Memphis St. R.R. Co. v. Bernstein, 137 Ter. 637, 194 S.V.
902 (1917); Texas: Hill v. Kimball, 76 rex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Va.: Bowles
v. May 159 Va. 419. 166 S.E. 550 (1932); Wash.: Cherry v. Cen Petrolnem Corp.,
172 Wash. 688, 21 P.2d 520 (1933); W.Va.: Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W.Va, 124,
125 S.E. 244 (1924); \Visc.: Pankopf v. 1-inkley, 141 Vis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909);
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 436 (2) (1934); See PROSSER, TORTS § 37 (2d. ed. 1955).
2. L.R. 26 IR. 428 (1890) The court relied upon the unreported Case of Byrne
v. Great Southern & Western Ry. Co. where recovery was granted although the plaintiff
admitted that not a hair of his head was touched. Contra: Victorian Rys. Comm. v.
Coultas. 13 App. Cas. 222. 57 L.J.P.C. 69 (P.C. 1888).
3. 76 Tex.210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
4. Lindly v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918); Sloanne v. Sou'thern
Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320 (1896); 128 Conn. 321, 21 A.2d 402 (1941);
See Smith, H.AV. Relations of Functions to Injury and Diseases: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rav. 193 (1944).
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the wrong and the injury.' The courts have not hesitated to deny recovery
where negligence results fright alone6 thus insisting upon ensuing physical
injuries in order to guarantee the merits of the claim. 7 The present view
of. the majority is reflected by Chief Justice Maltbie in the leading case of
Orlo v. Connecticut Co.8
It is, then, well within the logic of law that where results
which are regarded as proper elements of recovery as a consequence
of physical injury are caused by fright or nervous shock due to
negligence, recovery should be permitted . . . . Certainly it is a
very questionable position for a court to take, that because of
the possibility of encouraging fictitious claims compensation should
be denied those who have actually suffered serious injury through
the negligence of another.9
Some decisions have modified this liberal rule by insisting that in
order to give rise to a right of action grounded on negligent conduct, the
shock must be occasioned by fear of personal injury to a person sustaining
the shock, and not fear of injury to property or to the person of another. 10
A minority of jurisdictions," including Florida,"-' still insist that the
plaintiff prove a contemporaneous physical impact as a necessary condition
5. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); Pur-
cell v. St. Paul R.R., 48 Minn. 34, 50 N.W. 1034 (18921.
6. E.g., Bachilder v. Morgan, 179 Ala. 339, 60 So. 815; illiamson v. Central
of Georgia R.R., 127 Ga. 125, 56 S.E. 119; Braun v. Craven, 175 11. 401, 51 N.E. 657;
See, 17 C.J. Damages § 158 n. 93 (1919); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 70 n. 93 (1941).
7. Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 Atl. 668 (1909); Purcell v.
St. Paul City R.R., '18 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Chicehiolo v. New England
'Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128
Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Atl. 202
(1907); See Restatement, Torts § 313 (1934). But see 2 Restatement, Torts, 436 (2)
Caveat as to possible unreliability of testimony.
8. 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941).
9. Id. at 238, 239, 21 A.2d 402 at 405.
10. Goddard v. Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S.E. 304 (1914); Cleveland, C.C.
& St. L. R.R., v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 274, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); McGee v. Vanover,
148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W. 742 (1912); Sanderson v. Northern R.R., 28 Minn. 162,
92 N.W. 542 (1902); Nuckles v. Tenn. Electric Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299
S.W. 775 (1927); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935);
Contra: Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 AtI. 182 (1933); Watson v. Dilts,
116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1069 (1902); Rasmussen v. Bensin, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W.
674 (1937); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Lambert v. Browster,
97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Handbrook v. Stokes Bros., [C.A. 1925] I.K.B.
141 (viewing the problem from the standpoint of proximate cause rather than duty).
11. U.S.: Haile's Curator v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 60 Fed. 557 (C.C.A. 5th
(18941; Ark.: St. Louis v. Brass, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901); Ill.: Braun v. Craven,
175 Ill. 401 5I N.E. 657 (1898); Ind.: Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App.
202, 47 N.E. 694 (1897); Ky.: McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W. 472 (1912);
Maine: Herrick v. Evening Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Aft. 16 (1921); Mass.:
Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mich.: Nelson v. Cran-
ford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Mo.: McArdle v. Pack Dry Goods'Co.,
191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095 (1915); N.J.: Ward v.-West Jersey & S. R.R., 65
N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (1900); N.Y.: Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 515 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1896); Ohio: Miller v. Baltimore R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499
(1908); Pa.: Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892).
12. Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954) (there must be wilful and wanton
negligence in order to recover). For decisions involving other forms of emotional dis-
tress see Note, 13 U. MIAMi L. Rav. 116 (1958).
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for the recovery of damages for physical injuries induced by fright. The
minority doctrine rests upon three principles: (1) since there can be no
recovery for fright, there can be no recovery for the consequences of
fright;'3 (2) the physical consequences of fright are too remote and are
not the proximate result of the negligence; 4 (3) public policy demands
that recovery be denied in order to prevent unjust claims.15 The judicial
policy in these states is to allow recovery: if the plaintiff can prove the
slightest contact10 either prior to or after the shock;' 7 for physical damages
sustained when fright leads the plaintiff to react instinctively to an apparent
peril;' 8 and without impact under their respective workmen's compensation
statutes.' 0
In the instant case, the court refuscd to change Pennsylvania's firmly
entrenched20 non-liability rule, rather than adopt the view of the weight
of authority. Justice Bell, speaking for the majority said:
13. St. Louis I.M. & S. R.R., v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901); Spade
v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151
N.Y. 107, 45 N.Y. 354 (1896).
14. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Word v. West Jersey &
S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atd. 561 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note
13; Miller v. Baltimore R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908); Ewing v. Pitts-
burgh C. & St. L. R.R., 147. Pa. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892).
15. Braun v. Craven, sujra note 14;. McGee v. Vanover 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W.
742 (1912); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell
v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
16. McArdle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W.
1095 (1915) (slight jar); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 AtI.
860 (1906) (dust ; Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) (slight
jar); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (smoke).
17. Impact prior to fright: Chespeake & Ohio Ry. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 152
S.W. 976 (1913); McCarthy v. Boston El. Ry. 222 Mass. 568, 212 N. E. 235 (1916)
thrown to floor by collision); Comstock v. Wilson, Supra note 16. Impact after fright:
Conley v. United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238, 105 N.E. 195 (1914); Driscoll v. Gaffey,
207 Mass. 102, 92 N.E. 1010 (1910); Cameron v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 182
Mass. 310, 65 N.E. 385 (1902); Howarth v. Adams Express Co., 269 Pa. 280, 112 Atl.
536 (1921); Hess v. American Pipe Mfg. Co., 221 Pa. 67, 70 Atl. 294 (1908)."
18. Freedman v. Eastern Mass. Street Ry., 299 Mass. 246, 126 N.E. 2d 739
1938) (passenger jumped at sound of slight collision); Chastain v. Winston, 152 S.W.
d 165 (Mo. 1941) (pedestrian threw up his hand causing object to rebound from
taxi-cab); Tuttle v. Atlantic City R.R., 66 N.J.L. 327, 49 At. (1901) (fell while
escaping from speeding derailed freight car); Buchannan v. West Jersey R.R., 52
N.J.L. 265, 19 At!. 254 (1890) (dropped to platform to escape from timber protruding
from car); Comstock v. Wilson 232 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) (fell after alight-
ing from car involved in collision).
19. Charon's Case 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E. 2d 511 (1947); Klein v. Len H.
Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922); Van Ness v. Borough of Haledon,
136 N.J.L. 623, 56 A.2d 888 (1948); Pickerell v. Schumacher, 215 App. Div. 745, 212
N.Y. Supp. 899 (3d Dep't. 1925), aff'd. 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926); :(The
absence of a jury might be responsible for this attitude).
20. Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa..164,_17 Atl. 604 (1889); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C. &
St.L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892); Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, .212
Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905);. Morris v. Lackawanna & Vyoming Valley R.R., 228
Pa. 198, 77 At. 445 (1910); Horwarth v. Adams Express Co., 269 Pa. 280. 1-12 Atl.
536 (1921); Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 322 Pa. 333, 185 Atl. 744 (1936); Hess
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948); Potere v. City of Phila-




To allow recovery for fright . with all the disturbances and
illnesses, which accompany or result therefrom where there has
been no physical injury or impact, would open a Pandora's
box . . .for every wholly genuine and deserving claim there would
likely be a tremendous number of illusive or imaginative or
fake ones.
21
The case of Potere v. Philadelphia22 was distinguished from the
instant case. In that case recovery was allowed for mental suffering and
fright associated with bodily injuries. The plaintiff in Hess v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co.2 was allowed to recover damages for physical injuries and
neurosis created by fright which resulted from an electric shock. In refusing
to apply the non-liability rules, the court reasoned that an electric shock
was a physical assault as distinguished from a mere nervous shock.
In a long, powerful dissent, Justice Musmanno humorously but logically
destroyed the court's contentions. If the court was afraid to allow the
plaintiff to submit her case to the jury because of the likelihood of an
onslaught of faked claims, he declared, our basic judicial system is worthless
and should be altered. Admitting that the Pennsylvania courts have con-
sistently denied recovery in fright cases does not mean, that the courts
must continue to do so. His metaphor eloquently pleads:
Stare decisis is the viaduct over which the law travels in
transporting the precious cargo of justice. Precedence and .. .
safety dictates that. the piers of that viaduct should be examined
...to make certain that they are sound, strong and capable of
supporting the weight above. 24
In reviewing Huston Y. Freemansburg,2r a supporting pillar of the non-
liability doctrine, the dissent, with the aid of hindsight, condemns the
theories of the case. Over fifty years ago, Chief Justice Mitchell reasoned
that since there is exaggeration and fraud in the ordinary negligence cases,
disaster would fall upon our courts if recovery were to be allowed in fright
cases. Justice Musmanno's opinion acidly suggests that the courts that
allow recovery for mental disorders from fright, despite the absence of
any impact, are still functioning properly. A review of the facts of the
cases cited by the majority2"' also leads Musmanno to resolve that the
"viaduct" is on shaky pillars because the cases are unsupportable in the
eyes of justice.
. 21. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, - , 142 A.2d 263, 266 (1958).
22. 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1956). .
23. 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948). .
.24.:Bosley v.'Andrews 393 Pa. 161, ' 142 A.2d 263, 280 (1958).
25.212"Pa. 548; 61 Atl 1022 (1905).
26. Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164, 17 Atl. 604 (1889) (grossly negiligent blasting
caused plaintiff to fall to the ground and sustain a heart attack); Morris v. Lackawanna
& Wyoming Valley R.R., 228 Pa. 198, 77 AtL. 445 (1910) (passenger sustained a mis-
carriage due to fright induced by derailed car); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C. & St., L. Ry.,
147 Pa. 40, 23 AtI. 340 (1892) (derailed car crashed into house causing nervous shock).
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The case of Samnara v. Allegheny Valley St. Ry, 27 was allowed to go
the jury. There, the plaintiff was seeking damages for neuritis occasioned
by fright created by a street car leaving its tracks. Her case was estab-
lished by the fact that she was thrown to the floor of the car. This case
and the instant case are indistinguishable in principle and logic. Justice
Musmanno reasoned that there should be no difference in being thrown to
the floor of a wild street car and collapsing to the ground in the path of a
charging bull. In neither case was there any contact between the victim
and the defendant's instrumentality.
The evidence in the Hess case indicated that even though the plain-
tiff received an electric shock the psycho-neurosis resulted from fear. The
dissent indicated that an inconsistent position was taken by the court when
recovery was allowed in the absence of any impact.
Even assuming that the majority's supporting cases were correct in law,
today the whole problem should be reappraised in the light of the tech-
nical advancements in the field of medicine. In Collins v. Chartiers Valley
Coal Co.,28 a case involving water contamination and not negligence, the
court as early at 1890 took judicial notice of the existing scientific progress.
Analogizing the principles in this and the instant case, Justice Musmanno
said, "It seems to me that it is a violation of the living spirit of the law
to adhere to an ancient rule which has no pragmatic application to the
realities of today.
' 20
The dissent contended that the jury in the instant case could have
determined whether Mrs. Bosley's heart attack was occasioned by her fear
of being gored just as easily as the jury in the Potere case decided that a
nervous disturbance was caused by the plaintiff's fear of falling, and not
by his sprained ankle. 1-leart ailments are physical injuries which are to be
differentiated from sentimental grief. It is evident to the dissent that
physical injuries can be created by the forces that do not physically touch
the body. The medical evidence offered and the proof thereof, in eases of
people blinded, and deafened by explosions, is similar to the problems
in the instant case.
The majority of the court refused to confer liability upon the de-
fendant because fifteen feet of space existed between the horns of Mr.
Andrews' bull and the prone body of Mrs. Bosley. Justice Musmanno
agrees with the arguments set forth in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Ervin of the Superior court:3 0 (1) the plaintiff could have recovered dam-
ages for her heart attack if the bull had grazed her slightly; (2) the. plain-
tiff could have recovered damages for any physical injuries, such as a broken
leg, sustained in-evading the bull's chase; (3) the distinction made by the
27. 238 Pa. 469, 86 Atd. 287 (1913).
28. 131 Pa. 143, 18 Ad. 1012 (1890).
29. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, -, 142 A.2d, 263, 274 (1958).
30. Bosley v. Andrews, 184 Pa. Super. 396, 135 A.2d 101 (1957).
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court, that the plaintiff cannot recover because she ran and fell and then
suffered a heart attack, is without merit.
An interesting inconsistency in the law of Pennsylvania is illustrated
by the case of Gillam v. Hague3 ' where damages were recovered for the loss
in value of a horse frightened by an automobile. The dissent inferred,
that since similar evidcntiary and causal problems appear in both this and
the instant case, Mr. Bosley would have recovered damages if his horse,
and not his wife, had collapsed.
Justice Musmanno concluded that, since the majority admits: (1)
medical evidence proved that Mrs. Bosley's heart disability was a direct result
of the bull's chase; (2) Mr. Andrews was a trespasser by the actions of his
cattle; then, under the law of quare clausum fregit, liability should follow
for all ensuing damages.
Mr. Andrews owed a duty to his neighbors to keep his cattle off their
land. The breach of this duty resulted in Mrs. Bosley sustaining a heart
attack. It is difficult to see why the proximate cause of the injury was any-
thing but the fright created by the bull's chase. Certainly it was forsee-
able that wild cattle might frighten those who attempted to constrain
then. Applying their predecessors' reasoning, the court refused the plain-
tiff the right to redress at law because she was fortunate enough not to be
struck by the defendant's bull. Proof of impact has always been required
by the Pennsylvania courts in order to enable the plaintiff to take his case
to the jury. The only reason presented by the court for denying recovery
was the fear of setting a precedent that would eventually create a flood
of unjust claims. The practical experience gained from observing the rec-
ords of jurisdictions allowing recovery, unquestionably wrecks any possible
foundation for maintaining this view. Our judicial system is mature
enough to separate the wheat from the chaff before any damage can be
done. A blind adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis destroys the very
basis of judge-made tort law. The judicial policy of our modern courts
must be flexible in order to conform to the needs and advancements of
society.
LAWRENCE J. SHONGUT
GUEST STATUTE - CHANGE OF STATUS
Plaintiff, a passenger in defendant's automobile, was injured after
protesting about defendant's improper driving and demanding to be let out.
Held, plaintiff's reasonable protest and demand to leave the automobile
changed her status from guest to that of a passenger against her will. There-
31. 39 Pa. Super. 547 (1909).
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